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Abstract
In Nicaragua and elsewhere in Central America, small-scale farmers are weighing
the risks of entering into contracts with supermarket chains. We use unique data on
negotiated prices from Nicaraguan farm cooperatives supplying supermarkets to study
the impact of supply agreements on producers’ mean output prices and price stability.
We ﬁnd that prices paid by the domestic retail chain approximate the traditional
market in mean and variance. In contrast, we ﬁnd that mean prices paid by Wal-mart
are signiﬁcantly lower than the traditional market but that Wal-Mart systematically
reduces price volatility compared with the traditional market. We ﬁnd some evidence,
however, that farmers may be paying too much for this contractual insurance against
price variation.
keywords: small farmers, supermarkets, contracts, Wal-Mart, Latin America, Nicaragua
 The data and qualitative details in this analysis were gathered in Nicaragua between September 2007
and July 2008 in collaboration with the Nitlapan Institute at the Universidad Centro Americana. Producer
cooperatives with ongoing supply relationships with the two major food retail groups operating in Nicaragua
provided data on prices received and quantities sold over time and traditional market data was accessed
through Nicaragua’s governmental statistical agency. Veronica Palladino helped gather data on supermar-
ket retail outlet growth. This material is based upon work supported by the United States Agency for
International Development via the Assets and Markets the BASIS Assets and Market Access Collaborative
Research Suport Program and the Social Science Research Council.
†Copyright 2010 by Hope Michelson, Thomas Reardon, and Francisco Perez.
11 Introduction
Supply relationships between supermarket chains and small farmers in the developing world
represent a key intersection of current critical dimensions of economic theory and pol-
icy: participation of the rural poor in regional and global markets; possibilities for rural
entrepreneurship in developing world contexts; and contract negotiation between small,
constrained growers and large, well-capitalized buyers to resolve idiosyncratic market fail-
ures.
This paper uses data from Nicaraguan supermarket contracts to analyze market relation-
ships emerging between farmers and supermarkets. The contracts we examine are nego-
tiated by three Nicaraguan farmer-cooperatives and vary both over supermarket chains
and over time. Using these data we can establish for the ﬁrst time how supply agree-
ments impact farmers’ output price distributions compared with the traditional market
and how contract terms change over time. The resulting analysis o ers a new perspective
on potential payo s to participation in supermarket supply chains for farmers.
Research has focused both on understanding whether and why supermarkets source from
small farmers and on establishing welfare impacts of supply relationships on small farm-
ers. Considerable research has anticipated (Barrett and Reardon, 2000; Blandon et al.,
2009; Key and Runsten, 1999; Kirsten and Sartorius, 2002; Gibbon, 2003) and identiﬁed
(Dolan and Humphrey, 2000; Boselie et al., 2003; Reardon et al., 2003) the exclusion of
small farmers from supermarket supply chains. Other ﬁndings suggest that small farm-
ers are included (Maertens and Swinnen, 2009) or ﬁnd that inclusion is conﬁned to those
small farmers who are relatively well-capitalized with non-land capital such as irrigation
(Hern´ andez et al., 2007), or who gain access through established producer associations
(Balsevich et al., 2005).
Most of the research analyzing participation in supermarket supply chains also considers
the impacts of that participation. There has been less rigorous analysis as yet of the way
that supermarket supply relationships impact participants’ mean output prices and price
stability. Typically, the approach has been to compare average returns per kilogram, per-
haps controlling for quality, between farmers supplying to supermarkets and those not.
The extant literature does not empirically test for increased farmer mean proﬁt or de-
creased marketing risk under contractual relationship with a supermarket. For example, in
their study of supermarket suppliers in Senegal, Maertens et al (2008) write “small farm-
ers...reduced production and marketing risks” (p.5). Similar assumptions can be found in
Swinnen (2007), Boselie et al (2003), Kirsten and Sartorius (2002), Neven and Reardon
(2008), and Swinnen and Maertens (2007).
Two important gaps thus exist in the literature. First, no paper has addressed whether
the terms of exchange for small farmers – both level and variance – are better or worse
2with modern versus traditional retail. Second, while there has been measurement of the
average payo  over channels using farm data, the robustness of these ﬁndings has not
been validated over time, over contract types, or chains. Moreover, the analysis has been
conﬁned to study of the average payo , with little attention to variability in payo .A
number of works have posited that supermarkets reduce output price variability but have
lacked data to test whether variability is reduced and by how much.
Building on the insights of existing research, we use historical prices negotiated between
supermarkets and farmers to analyze for the ﬁrst time the average payo  and payo  vari-
ability of supermarket channels compared with the traditional market. We ﬁnd that prices
in La Colonia, the domestic chain, approximate the traditional market in mean and vari-
ance. In contrast, we ﬁnd that mean prices paid to suppliers of Wal-mart supermarkets
are signiﬁcantly lower than the traditional market. Instead, we ﬁnd that Wal-Mart supply
agreements represent signiﬁcant reductions in price risk to farmers over the traditional
market. Deriving farmers’ implied relative risk aversion from these contracts, we ﬁnd some
evidence that farmers may be paying too much for this implicit insurance against price
variation. Our ﬁndings, which support the extant hypothesis in the literature that super-
markets decrease output price variability, add new evidence to the current debate regarding
supermarkets in the developing world as agents of change and economic stimulus.
This study uses data collected from two primary sources. First, we gathered from three
farmer cooperatives detailed records of the historical prices negotiated with supermarkets.
Figure 1 presents the sequence and coverage of the price data from cooperatives. Second,
we use historical (January 2001–June 2008) traditional market weekly price data from the
Nicaraguan government Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry (MAGFOR) o ce.
Because our analysis compares crop prices across marketing channels, we have given careful
consideration to possible quality di erences between markets. Based on interviews with
supermarket buyers and traditional market wholesalers as well as considerable time spent
observing transactions in wholesale markets and supermarkets, we have found that super-
markets in Nicaragua purchase the premium share of a farmers’ production for the horti-
cultural crops studied here. Our results indicate that the mean supermarket purchase share
of farmers’ total production is close to 70 percent. The 70 percent supermarkets purchase
is carefully culled: for example, Wal-Mart follows a tightly-guarded manual of product-
speciﬁc quality standards, codifying required attributes such as variety, size, coloration,
cleanliness, damage, and weight. La Colonia follows a similar quality selection process.
In contrast, traditional market wholesalers purchase nearly 100 percent of a seller’s pro-
duction, buying all size grades, discarding only damaged or extremely small vegetables or
fruits.
Because supermarkets purchase less than 100 percent of the farmers’ production and be-
cause that share is carefully edited to meet chain-speciﬁc standards, our analysis assumes
that mean product quality in the supermarket channel is at least as high as the traditional
3channel. Because we compare a product in the supermarket chain with quality at least as
high as the traditional market, our ﬁnding that mean prices in the supermarket chain are
not signiﬁcantly higher than in the traditional market is made even stronger.
[Figure 1 about here.]
The next section provides context: critical features of the Nicaraguan traditional and
modern horticulture markets, the population of horticulture producers, and the operations
of the two primary supermarket chains operating in the country. The third section analyzes
the mean and variance in output price, comparing supply agreements between farmers and
supermarkets in Nicaragua to the traditional wholesale market. A fourth section derives
coe cients of farmer relative risk aversion to evaluate the mean/variance trade-o  for a
producers’ cooperative in the Wal-Mart supply chain. The ﬁnal section concludes.
2 Fresh fruit and vegetable production in Nicaragua
Nicaragua’s population of horticulture producers constitutes a tiny share of total farmers.
According to the country’s 2001 agricultural census, while 76 percent of landholding farm-
ers grew basic grains including maize, beans, and sorghum, only 2.14 percent cultivated
tomatoes, 1.23 percent green peppers, and 0.25 percent cabbage (MAGFOR, 2001).
Statistics on irrigation suggest the existence of dual production structures in Nicaragua’s
tiny horticulture sector; approximately one-third of 2001 horticulturalists were equipped
with production and price risk-mitigating irrigation. Moreover, the population of irrigated
horticulturists in the 2001 agricultural census was split between large growers (19.6 percent)
and small and medium growers with less than seven hectares (17.2 percent).
This production dualism deﬁned by irrigation is critical to producers’ experience in sea-
sonally volatile horticulture output markets. Rainfed Nicaraguan horticulture farmers
generally produce one or two seasons of crops each year and sell their harvest in a regional
spot market or to a buyer at the farmgate. Nicaraguan small farmers without irrigation
describe a volatile boom-bust cycle of fresh fruit and vegetable farming driven primarily
by output swings in the market. The farmer without irrigation, cold storage, or means to
move perishable product quickly to another zone must sell when there is a local glut and
su er the price drop. Thus, farmers without irrigation are likely to be more concerned
about price variability than those with irrigation who can sell in times of high prices and
beneﬁt from price variation.
Dualism in the Nicaraguan horticulture production sector therefore suggests a potential
tension in supermarket contract adoption. While the supermarket is likely to prefer irri-
gated farmers who can o er the retailer steady supply streams throughout the year, those
with irrigation and capacity have less incentive to adopt the contract given that they are
4already playing the market, riding out the ups and down of the output price. Conversely,
rainfed horticulture farmers struggling to manage high price volatility will have more in-
centive to adopt the supply contract but are likely to be hindered by a lack of productive
capacity.
A third-party program funded by the United States Agency for International Development
(USAID) has emerged in Nicaragua to equip small farmers with the liquidity and irrigation
systems to permit an intensive farming schedule and to begin to resolve this contracting
asymmetry. In June, 2006 USAID contracted with four multinational NGOs to begin
working with farmers on a three-year, $20 million project (USAID and Nicaragua, 2006)
designed to meet the needs of supplying supermarkets in Nicaragua.
These intermediary NGO programs seem to have obviated supermarkets’ distinction be-
tween farmers with irrigation and without. We observe that farmers adopting supply
contracts in this analysis are largely those likely to value the price stability associated with
the contract and the capacity building facilitated by the NGO: small farmers without ir-
rigation before the program. The 54 suppliers who are members of the three cooperatives
included in this analysis are overwhelmingly drawn from the rainfed horticulture sector.
Table 1 disaggregates supplier farmers according to their 2001 landholdings and irrigation
in the year before supply chain entry; mostly small farmers (77.8 percent) and mostly
without irrigation (88.9 percent).
[Table 1 about here.]
2.1 Supermarkets in Nicaragua
Two companies dominate Nicaragua’s supermarket retail: La Colonia is a 10-store (2008)
family-owned national chain that has operated in Nicaragua since the late 1960s; and Wal-
Mart Central America, which acquired a controlling stake in Corporacion de Supermercados
Unidos’ (CSU) 380 Central American retail outlets in April 2006. As of May 2009, Wal-
Mart had expanded CSU’s 33 retail stores in Nicaragua to 52 Nicaraguan outlets.
The two retail groups have developed distinct procurement strategies. La Colonia relies
heavily on a network of traditional wholesalers as well as approximately 50 preferred small
farmers working alone or in one of two producer cooperatives. Because La Colonia has no
warehouse, the company holds minimal inventory between purchases and suppliers daily
transport fresh produce to the chain’s headquarters in Managua.
Wal-Mart has taken a di erent approach to developing a domestic supply chain in Nicaragua,
using buyers to source products in rural areas rather than relying on farmers to manage
transport. Wal-Mart’s procurement division picks up production from supplier farmers in
the farmers’ ﬁeld or community. As Wal-Mart has extended procurement and retail into
5more remote regions, the company has kept transport costs down by using supply trucks
to backhaul agricultural production to the central warehouses.
3 Small farmer outcomes: price mean and volatility
Taking the contract choice as given, in this section we use data from traditional markets
and producer cooperatives to study how supply agreements between small farmers and
supermarkets impact mean price and price stability.
Units of analysis: per kilogram prices at farmgate
Our analysis uses per kilogram farmgate prices to compare the traditional and supermarket
channels. Transaction sites vary by supply chain, so we equalize prices at the farmgate by
subtracting transport costs to comparison markets. We describe brieﬂy how the farmgate
price series are constructed.
Because Wal-Mart picks up products sourced from farmers in farmer communities well out-
side the capital city, we equalize transport costs between the Wal-Mart farmgate prices and
the Managua-sited transactions of La Colonia and the traditional wholesale market. We
subtract cooperative-speciﬁc transport costs from the La Colonia and Managua traditional
market prices.1 Once we equalize transport costs, we can compare farmgate prices be-
tween our three price series: traditional (Managua), Wal-Mart (farmgate), and La Colonia
(Managua).
Unless otherwise noted, prices are compared between supermarket and traditional market
channels over equivalent time periods. That is, if a contract relationship between a super-
market and a cooperative lasted between April 2005 and November 2006, the comparison
traditional market price series is considered for the same period. Also unless otherwise
speciﬁed, all prices in the paper have been adjusted to July 1999 Cordobas. One January
2008 US$= 14.53 July 1999 Cordobas ($C). Computed farmgate prices are gross per kilo;
we do not subtract production costs of the farm.
Non-transport related transactions costs
We have observed that farmers selling to supermarkets generally incur the standard trans-
actions costs of the traditional market in addition to the costs of sorting, grading, cleaning,
and packing production to meet supermarkets’ speciﬁc quality criteria. We therefore as-
sume that non-transport related transactions costs are at least as high in the supermarket
channel as in the traditional wholesale market. Signiﬁcant qualitative and survey evidence
motivates our assumption. To begin with, both La Colonia and Wal-Mart demand signif-
icant cleaning, selecting, and sorting of the product to meet stipulated quality standards.
These costs are not incurred in the traditional channel. Moreover, as discussed in the intro-
6duction, while farmers can sell all of their production in traditional markets with minimal
loss due to quality grading, our data indicate that farmers supplying supermarkets sell ap-
proximately 70 percent of their production.2 Because the supermarket does not purchase
all of a farmers’ production, farmers and cooperatives are generally in multiple markets,
selling product rejected by the supermarket to a broker at farmgate or to a wholesaler
in a local or regional market. This means that participant farmers generally incur the
transactions costs of two markets instead of one.
3.1 Supermarkets do not increase mean prices
Because supermarkets purchase a premium share of the farmers’ production and require
post-harvest processing beyond the demands of the traditional market, we expect farmers
selling to supermarkets to receive higher mean output prices for their production. We can
test whether mean per kilo prices in the supermarket channel are signiﬁcantly higher than
in the traditional market by matching data collected from cooperatives with traditional
market prices over corresponding periods. Because the two retail chains’ distinct pro-
curement strategies have important implications for the analysis, we evaluate the chains’
contract prices in turn.
Wal-Mart
The timing of the contract observations is valuable to understanding the sequence of Wal-
Mart supply agreements. We observe two epochs of Wal-Mart supplier relations: the S´ ebaco
cooperative is an example of ﬁrst-generation Wal-Mart supply agreements and Ocotal a
second-generation contract. The S´ ebaco cooperative sold to Wal-Mart between April 2005
and November 2006 but left the Wal-Mart relationship to supply La Colonia, providing
us with an observation of a cooperative that operated in both supermarket channels and
demonstrated a preference for La Colonia over Wal-Mart. The Ocotal cooperative con-
tracted with Wal-Mart as the S´ ebaco cooperative left the supermarket in mid-2006.
In the top half of Table 2 we compare mean per kilo farmgate prices between Wal-Mart
and the traditional market using a standard ttest to test for equivalence in means between
the traditional market and supermarket farmgate price distributions.
We ﬁnd that, for both ﬁrst and second-generation contracts, mean per kilo prices for both
salad and roma tomatoes are signiﬁcantly lower selling to Wal-Mart than the traditional
channel for both cooperatives. The gap in mean prices across the channels is striking and
economically signiﬁcant; the di erence between Wal-Mart and the traditional market price
(as a percent of the Wal-Mart price) is between 34 and 54 percent.
Note that farmgate prices in Table 2 were negotiated and reported by cooperatives assisted
and at least partially ﬁnanced by NGOs. These cooperatives sell in bulk quantities via one
7group transaction to the supermarkets, reducing buyer coordination, quality assessment,
and transport costs. Because of the convenience, quality, and bulk quantity attributes they
o er the supermarkets, these suppliers are positioned to negotiate relatively a high price
with supermarkets. Yet here we ﬁnd the opposite.
La Colonia
In the bottom half of Table 2 we compare the La Colonia price series against their tradi-
tional market counterparts for the S´ ebaco and Tomatoya cooperatives.
We ﬁnd that La Colonia’s mean farmgate prices compare somewhat more favorably to the
traditional market than Wal-Mart. La Colonia represents a mix of both higher and lower
mean farmgate prices than the traditional market. Over the speciﬁed time periods3 we
ﬁnd: La Colonia’s mean lettuce farmgate prices are signiﬁcantly lower than traditional
market sales; La Colonia’s mean salad tomato and cabbage prices are signiﬁcantly higher
than the traditional market channel; and we fail to reject the hypothesis of the equivalence
of mean farmgate prices between the La Colonia channel and the traditional market for
per kilo roma tomato and small green peppers.
[Table 2 about here.]
Results in Table 2 demonstrate two general results. First, prices in the supermarket supply
channel are not always signiﬁcantly higher than the traditional market. Second, La Colonia
o ers a mean price that is a much closer approximation to the traditional market while Wal-
Mart compares relatively poorly with the traditional market, paying suppliers signiﬁcantly
below parity.
These results are even more surprising given that prices in Table 2 are gross of post-
harvest production costs speciﬁc to the supermarket chain including cleaning, selection,
and packing. For example, S´ ebaco cooperative farmers who sell to La Colonia contribute
three percent of their sales proceeds for administrative services and weekly pay a team
of ten women who select and clean produce $C 100 apiece (2008 Cordobas). So the net
supermarket farmgate price is even lower than reported above. Again, because of the post-
harvest processing and selection costs incurred by the farmer cooperative we would expect
a signiﬁcantly higher mean price. Yet this is not what we ﬁnd.
Our analysis of supermarkets’ relative mean price raises two interesting questions. Why
might farmers accept a low price for a quality product if a higher traditional market price
was available? And why are mean farmgate prices with Wal-Mart systematically lower
than the traditional market relative to La Colonia?
One explanation for the di erences between the chains in Table 2 is the di erence in
procurement structures distinguishing the Wal-Mart supply network from the La Colonia
system: Wal-Mart sends its trucks to the farmers’ community to source production while
La Colonia suppliers make the trip to the supermarket’s Managua headquarters themselves.
8Wal-Mart, therefore, can exploit the existence of regional spatial market segmentation in
horticulture by assuming the transportation costs and logistical risks of sourcing the crop
in the ﬁeld.
Evidence that ﬁeld brokers at farmgate pay a price below the extant wholesale market price
less transport costs would suggest the presence of market segmentation; an opportunity for
Wal-Mart’s procurement and contracting. Table 3, which compares per kilo mean prices
farmers reported receiving at farmgate from traditional wholesalers, presents evidence to
this e ect. Surveyed farmers were asked maximum, minimum, and most common (modal)
price observed for their most remunerative crop. A triangle distribution was used to infer
the mean of the regional farmgate wholesale price paid by ﬁeld brokers. For comparison,
we include corresponding Wal-Mart, La Colonia, and Managua mean per kilo farmgate
prices.
[Table 3 about here.]
Evidence in Table 3 suggests the existence of asymmetries in Nicaraguan horticulture
markets in which local brokers sourcing at farmgate can pay a price below the extant
wholesale market price less transport costs. Signiﬁcant margins in Table 3 separate the
per kilo prices farmers report receiving from traditional wholesalers at the farmgate and
documented farmgate per kilo prices (price less transport) in the Managua market. Wal-
Mart mean farmgate prices most closely approximate prices reported by farmers transacting
with traditional buyers at the farmgate in Table 3. Note that we cannot use this data to
actually test for the presence of supernumerary proﬁts and thus local market power for
either ﬁeld brokers or Wal-Mart.
Evidence in Table 3 suggests the existence of spatial market segmentation that might
result from a lack of public or private transport to take crops to market, credit to ﬁnance
transport, or coordination failures to bulk production with other farmers. The assumption
that Managua per kilo wholesale prices less transport costs should equal farmgate prices is
based on a further assumption: that farmers can transport the crop to Managua themselves
or that competition among farmgate traders bids away supernumerary-proﬁt. A failure in
the capital markets for small farmers, however, increases the price of transporting the
crop if farmers cannot secure funds to purchase or rent transportation. A second problem
could stem from limited competition among farmgate wholesalers in rural output markets;
regional wholesaler monopsonies preserve trader marketing margins. Simultaneous failures
in these two markets, high opportunity costs of farmer time, or coordination failures among
farmers leave resource-poor small farmers to accept the low price o ered by traders at the
farmgate.
Evidence of supernumerary marketing margins separating farmgate prices from central
markets in an environment of capital constrained farmers suggests an opportunity for ar-
bitrage by a well-capitalized intermediary like Wal-Mart. Reaching deep into the country-
9side, Wal-Mart’s supply network facilitates participation by farmers who would otherwise
lack the capital to transport product to the central market in Managua. The company
can therefore take advantage of the signiﬁcant price margins separating the city from the
countryside, negotiating a per kilo farmgate price better than what traditional farmgate
wholesale buyers o er rural farmers yet still signiﬁcantly below the Managua price (less
transport costs). Of course, it may be that Wal-Mart assumes signiﬁcant procurement
costs and earns no proﬁt on the provision of procurement in farmers’ communities. How-
ever, Wal-Mart’s scale and e ciency imply bulk transport costs signiﬁcantly less than the
cooperatives’ transport costs. These are possibilities that we cannot test using our current
data.
La Colonia’s transaction proximity to the Managua market explains why the domestic
chain’s prices tend to approximate or exceed the per kilo farmgate prices estimated from
the Managua market prices (Table 2). La Colonia cannot take advantage of the spatial
arbitrage opportunity because its suppliers come to Managua to make semi-weekly deliver-
ies. La Colonia suppliers are equipped with trucks; they make habitual stops to sell excess
supply at the Managua markets after delivering product to the supermarket.
3.2 Supermarkets stabilize output price
We examine in this section how per kilo farmgate price volatility di ers across super-
market and traditional channels. Our analysis of whether supermarkets decrease output
price volatility relative to the traditional market begins with a comparison across channels
using statistics on channel variances and coe cients of variation. We then use ﬁrst or-
der stochastic dominance tests to more systematically study the producer’s mean-variance
tradeo  across traditional and supermarket channels.
Signiﬁcant price volatility is a serious concern for farm households. When ﬁrms proﬁt
maximize, the convexity of the proﬁt function implies a ﬁrm prefers price volatility. But
if household production and consumption decisions are nonseparable and the household
is income risk averse then the household is also price risk averse. Residual uninsured
risk exposure can lead to ine cient production and investment as households routinely
undertake costly measures to reduce exposure. A decrease in output price risk can be
expected to lead to improved e ciency in production and investment.
Data from farmer cooperatives and the traditional market support the hypothesis that
supermarkets reduce price volatility over the traditional market. Table 4 reports the ﬁrst
and second moments of producer cooperative and traditional market price distributions
using the price data analyzed in Table 2. As in the analysis of mean prices across channels,
we consider relative price variance by supermarket chain in turn.
[Table 4 about here.]
10Wal-Mart
The ﬁrst and second moments of the price distributions reported in Table 4 suggest that
Wal-Mart’s suppliers negotiate a mean/variance tradeo ; a lower mean per kilo farmgate
price is paired with less volatile price for all Wal-Mart crops and both ﬁrst and second-
generation contracts. Initial comparisons across moments of distributions in Table 4 suggest
that the Wal-Mart relationship systematically dampens the volatility in farmgate per kilo
prices compared with the traditional channel, but the exchange for this tempering may be
a reduction in mean price. Coe cients of variation in the Wal-Mart channel are uniformly
lower than the traditional market.
La Colonia
As we found in our comparison of mean prices across channels (Table 2), La Colonia ex-
hibits trends that are both distinct from Wal-Mart and distinct across crops. For example,
the traditional lettuce market o ers a more stable, higher mean per kilo farmgate price;
La Colonia exhibits a higher mean and lower variance price for salad tomatoes; but cab-
bage prices are characterized by a higher mean with the supermarket and slightly higher
variance.
We can more systematically study the producer’s mean-variance tradeo  across channel-
speciﬁc price distributions by testing the stochastic dominance of supermarket price distri-
butions against the traditional market farmgate price distribution. Each crop-speciﬁc pair
of price distributions is characterized by cumulative distribution functions FT and FS for
the traditional and supermarket channels, respectively. For all monotonically increasing
utility functions, distribution FS ﬁrst-order stochastically dominates (FOSD) distribution
FT if FS(x)   FT(x) for all farmgate price levels, x. Using ﬁrst order stochastic dominance
tests, distributions can be ranked according to their returns. The weakness of the ﬁrst
order stochastic dominance test is that it is a partial ordering, unable to rank distributions
whose cumulative distribution functions cross.
For the stochastic dominance tests, we use all dates for which we have price information for
the traditional market. We include prices for all recorded dates for the traditional market
under the assumption that the full 2001-2008 series better reﬂects the true intertemporal
distribution of per kilo prices in the marketplace. To compare 2001-2008 prices with the
period of the supply relationship we must assume both that the underlying price generating
process is unchanged and that farmers perceive the 2001-2008 distribution as a consistent
representation of the distribution of farmgate prices that they face.
Note that the comparison of per kilo prices below using stochastic dominance tests (Table
5) should be treated as a best-case scenario in a comparison of expected revenues across
traditional and supermarket channels. The reason: our analysis compares per kilo farmgate
prices while a comparison of total revenues would interact the price distribution under the
supermarket with quantities sold. Evidence from our household survey data and farmer
11interviews suggest that supermarket relationships can introduce new areas of uncertainty
into the producer portfolio of marketing risks. We have discussed supermarkets’ tendency
to purchase less than a farmer’s total production. Moreover, supermarket agreements can
increase a farmer’s risk of total loss should the supermarket renege on the sales agreement
at the time of harvest through failure to purchase or failure to pay. For example, our data
suggests that the likelihood of loss due to supermarket failure to make payment is signif-
icantly higher than the traditional market; the reported annual incidence of supermarket
payment default is 1.3 percent, nearly double the traditional market incidence rate at the
farmgate and 14 times the payment default rate reported in regional markets.
Given that the supermarket represents an increase in both the probability of buyer default
and of rejections resulting from standards enforcement, the supermarket per kilo revenue
distribution will always have a higher mass at zero than the traditional markets. Therefore
a dominance test comparing total revenue distributions between the traditional market
and the supermarket channel, the distribution of possible total revenue outcomes under
the supermarket can never ﬁrst order dominate the traditional market.
La Colonia
Table 5 presents a summary of the results of stochastic dominance tests. Figure 2 plots
the cumulative distribution functions (CDFs) for both salad and roma tomatoes for La
Colonia and the ﬁrst and second-generation Wal-Mart contracts, illustrating the ﬁrst order
stochastic dominance tests in Table 5. As expected from results in Tables 2 and 4 La
Colonia price CDFs in some cases dominate and in others are dominated by the traditional
channel.
[Table 5 about here.]
[Figure 2 about here.]
Wal-Mart
As with the mean price comparisons, the sequence of Wal-Mart supply agreements is critical
to interpreting the FOSD tests. Results in Table 5 and the second row of Figure 2 indicate
that traditional market ﬁrst order dominates the supermarket for Wal-Mart’s early ﬁrst-
generation contracts for roma and salad tomatoes from S´ ebaco.
In the FOSD joint analysis of the ﬁrst and the second moment of the price distribution
we see evidence of Wal-Mart’s contractual evolution with its suppliers. In a departure
from the earlier contracts, Table 5 and the bottom row of Figure 2 demonstrate that the
second-generation contracts for tomatoes from Ocotal were not strictly dominated by the
traditional markets; a cross in the CDFs renders the test inconclusive.
In fact, the dominated nature of Wal-Mart’s ﬁrst generation contracts may explain the
introduction of the second-generation agreements. Early Wal-Mart supply agreements did
12not increase mean farmgate prices for the farmer relative to the traditional market – indeed,
our data indicates that these contracts were stochastically dominated by the traditional
market.
The second-generation of Wal-Mart contracts codiﬁed what had previously been an implicit
price insurance of the contract. Beginning in 2007, Wal-Mart introduced supply agreements
that explicitly provide farmers insurance against price risks of the traditional market. The
company also began moving NGO-backed farmers and farmer cooperatives to year-round
production agreements featuring seasonal planting plans. In early 2008, farmers described
three distinct contract types, all contracts pegged to a reference traditional market price,
an average at the time of sale of the prices in two Managua wholesale markets and a regional
market close to the farmer. The three contract types were: an average-price contract in
which Wal-Mart pays the average traditional market price; a price-band contract in which
Wal-Mart and the farmers ﬁx an upper and lower bound on the average traditional market
price and Wal-Mart pays the farmer the lower bound if the average falls below the lower
bound and the upper bound if the average market price exceeds the upper bound; and a
price-ﬂoor contract (introduced in 2008) in which Walmart and farmers ﬁx a lower bound
on the average traditional market price and Wal-Mart pays the average traditional market
price less 15 percent or the ﬂoor price.
Wal-Mart and the Ocotal cooperative negotiated a price band contract in 2007. The
mininmum negotiated price for roma tomatoes was 3.50 C$/kilo and the maximum 6.20
C$/kilo. The comparison means from the Managua wholesale market during this period
was 5.02 C$/kilo and the reported mean farmgate price for roma tomaoes 4.43 C$/kilo
(Table 3). Salad tomatoes had a negotiated minimum price of 5.52 C$/kilo, and maximum
at 8.27 C$/kilo; the Managua comparison mean for salad tomatoes was 6.34 C$/kilo. The
2007 contract also set minimum and maximum prices for sweet bell pepper, small green
pepper, jalapeno pepper, cucumber, and baby corn.
Both the price-band contract and the price-ﬂoor contract embed an insurance contract; the
supermarket eliminates some share of traditional market downside price risk, truncating
the lower tail of the traditional market price distribution. Producers pay for the insurance
in the form of a reduced mean price. The bottom row of Figure 2 plots the CDFs for roma
and salad tomatoes for the Ocotal cooperative for the tenure of their relationship with Wal-
Mart through May 2008. The two ﬁgures in the bottom row clearly illustrate the critical
di erence between the banded Ocotal contracts and Wal-Mart’s supply relationships with
the S´ ebaco cooperative: the truncation of the bottom of the traditional market distribution.
Ocotal cooperative farmers reported in March 2008 that they preferred these insurance
contracts to the traditional market.4
A critical question we address to in the next section is how much farmers are willing to lower
their expected mean price with the supermarket in order to truncate their distribution of
possible per kilo prices. Do farmers pay too much?
134 Estimates of relative risk aversion coe cients
We have established that a primary impact of a supply agreement for small farmers is
a reduction in price volatility. The contract reduces uninsured risk exposure that can
discourage investment and innovation and risk averse households are expected to be willing
to pay a premium to reduce risk exposure. Households have heterogeneous risk preferences;
in general, poorer households are more risk averse and are willing to pay more than wealthy
households to avoid a monetarily equivalent risk. In the context of our analysis, a higher
willingness of poor households to pay to avoid price risk could provide another explanation
for the willingness of supermarkets to work with small farmers.
We can determine whether farmers adopting Wal-Mart supply contracts are paying too
much for the price risk insurance by using our data to compute the farmers’ minimum
relative risk coe cients that rationalize acceptance of the contract. By comparing derived
relative risk coe cients with coe cients that have been estimated in the empirical risk
literature we can assess the degree of risk aversion implied by preference for the contracts
over the wholesale markets. Derived coe cients that signiﬁcantly exceed ranges in the
literature would imply that farmers are accepting a reduction in mean price which is too
high.
Greater risk aversion is associated with a more curved utility function. The coe cient of
relative risk aversion, R at income Y , is the elasticity of marginal utility at income Y . The
dimensionless measure is deﬁned as:
R(Y )=
 YU  (Y )
U (Y )
(1)
Newbery and Stiglitz’ (1981) Taylor series approximation of certainty equivalent income
gives an approximate deﬁnition of relative risk aversion: individual i’s relative risk aversion






We assume that the traditional market price pt is characterized by variance  2
t and the
Wal-Mart supply channel price is characterized by  2
s, with ¯ pt > ¯ ps and  2
t >  2
s. The
risk premium,  i, is equal to farmers’ annual quantity of tomatoes transacted, Qi, times
the di erence in mean per kilo farmgate prices between the traditional and supermarket
channels. Thus  i is the mean revenue increment the farmer foregoes for the stability of the
supermarket channel. We use predicted 2007 household income for ¯ Y , regressing measured
2007 income on the household’s vector of assets, geographic controls, and demographic
characteristics to generate predicted income ˆ Y . The variance  2
Y is the variance in income
14attributable to accepting the bet, the price variance in the higher-mean traditional market,
var(Qpt) Equation 2 can be rewritten:
Ri(ˆ Yi)  









Equation 3 has an intuitive interpretation. The minimum relative risk aversion rationalizing
the investment in the supermarket supply chain is increasing in the di erence between
mean prices and decreasing in the variance of the traditional market and the quantity
transacted.
We use household survey data from Ocotal cooperative members who sell to Wal-mart
to compute farmer-speciﬁc coe cients of relative risk aversion. A second estimate uses
farmers who quit supplying supermarkets but continued to grow roma tomatoes.
Table 6 presents computed ranges of coe cients of relative risk aversion for farmers with
positive 2007 predicted incomes for current suppliers and farmers who left the supply chain
(non-suppliers). Coe cient means are somewhat high given estimated coe cients generally
range between one and three (Saha et al., 1994; Chavas and Holt, 1996). The distributions
of estimated coe cients suggest that some farmers’ adoption of supply agreements implies
implausibly large coe cients of relative risk aversion.
A second method to assess suppliers’ revealed relative risk preferences is to ﬁx R in Equa-
tion 3 and derive farmers’ implied willingness to pay for the new distribution, given R.
We assume R(ˆ Y ) to be equal to a range of values and estimate the maximum per kilo
risk premium (¯ pt   ¯ ps), the maximum mean price di erence between the traditional and
supermarket channels that rationalizes the adoption of the Wal-Mart contract. This per
kilo risk premium can be thought of as the farmer’s willingness to pay for the insurance
against price volatility in the supply contract. We set R(ˆ Y ) = 1,2,3 – values that have
been estimated in the literature using a range of utility functions and speciﬁcations (Saha
et al., 1994; Chavas and Holt, 1996). Bellemare et al. (2009) adopt a similar approach,
pegging relative risk aversions coe ents in estimations of crop cross-price risk aversion
coe cients.
The bottom section of Table 6 presents results from the second, willingness to pay method,
in which we set values of relative risk aversion R and compute farmer-speciﬁc limits on
the per kilo mean price reduction between the traditional and supermarket channel. The
true observed per kilo di erence in mean price between the traditional and supermarket
channels is 2.03 C$/kilo. Therefore, a computed maximum willingness to pay less than 2.03
C$/kilo suggests that farmers at the assumed level of relative risk aversion should reject the
contract, given their risk preferences and the price mean implied by the contract. The third
and ﬁfth columns of Table 6 indicate the percent of farmers (suppliers and non-suppliers) for
15whom, given the assumed level of risk aversion, the supermarket mean/variance reduction,
represents an economically reasonable choice over the traditional market.
Results in the lower half of Table 6 suggest that, over an established range of farmer risk
aversion, most current supplier farmers’ willingness to pay for the price insurance is less
than the contract’s 2.03 C$/kilo mean price reduction. That is, established levels of relative
risk aversion cannot explain the adoption levels that we see.
As expected, as assumed coe cients of relative risk aversion increase in Table 6, the terms
of the supermarket price distribution (speciﬁcally the reduction in mean price given the
reduction in price variance) are attractive to a larger share of both current participants
and non-suppliers. Notice comparing columns three and ﬁve that the terms of the supply
contract are relatively more suited to the non-suppliers – that is, a larger share of non-
suppliers at all levels of assumed relative risk aversion would accept the reduction in mean
price for the reduction in volatility it implied. Part of what drives the higher relative
suitability of the contract terms to the non-suppliers is that the derived maximum mean
price reduction (¯ pt   ¯ ps) is decreasing in income. As a group, the supermarket suppliers
have signiﬁcantly higher incomes than those not supplying supermarkets in Table 6 and
thus their maximum acceptable reduction in mean price given an assumed level of risk
aversion is relatively lower.
[Table 6 about here.]
Evidence in Table 6 suggests some farmers pay a high price for price volatility insurance in
the Wal-Mart contract. Two possible explanations might account for participant farmers’
apparent high willingness to pay for reductions in price volatility. First, our analysis may
be picking up the di erence between risk and loss aversion. If farmers are loss averse, with
a strong preference to avoid sharp seasonal price drops, they might have a higher value for
the insurance of the contract than our analysis can assess.
A second possibility is that farmers perceive the probability of an extremely low price in
traditional markets to be signiﬁcantly higher than reﬂected in the year-round data col-
lected by the Nicaraguan government. We have shown that farmers adopting supermarket
contracts are generally without irrigation at the time of adoption; their experience of hor-
ticulture markets prior to the supermarket is seasonal. When farmers adopt supermarket
contracts, they are generally moving into year-round production and marketing for the ﬁrst
time.
Producers may base risk assessments on prior marketing experience, likely limited to brief
periods of seasonal production characterized by high price volatility. Because traditional
seasonal non-irrigated producers of horticultural crops tend to harvest and plant within
the same narrow window as one another, they tend to be in the markets when prices are
most volatile. If producers remember these market gluts acutely, they may be willing to
accept from the supermarket contract a decrease in mean price in order to insure them-
16selves against what is, in fact, a relatively rare event, a price crash in a local or regional
market.
If this explanation holds, it would carry implications for the sustainability of Wal-Mart’s
contract structures and pricing over time. Farmers will update their beliefs about the
underlying price distributions over time, learning the true annual price distribution as
they switch to year-round cultivation, and their valuation of the contract may change.
Moreover, we ﬁnd that by 2008, 83.3 percent of the 54 supplier farmers in this analysis
were equipped with some irrigation. Given supermarkets serve as the spur to move to a
more intensive production calendar and investment in irrigation, and given that irrigation
systems provide farmers with the capacity to ride out seasonal price ﬂuctuations, it is
not clear if, once equipped with irrigation, farmers will continue to value the supermarket
contract.
5 Conclusions
Research into the consequences and possibilities of the expansion of supermarket opera-
tions in Africa, Asia, and Latin America has centered around establishing the economic
and institutional conditions under which supply relationships between small farmers and
supermarkets take place and documenting the impacts of the inclusion and exclusion of
smallholders. Research has not yet addressed the mean and variance of the net price paid
by supermarkets and traditional markets nor examined the variation in price mean and
stability over di erent contract designs. Finally, no work has examined the cost of reduc-
tion of risk in reduced means. Addressing these questions for the ﬁrst time, our analysis
o ers a new perspective on the payo s to participation in supermarket supply channels for
farmers.
We ﬁnd that La Colonia, Nicaragua’s domestic supermarket chain o ers farmers a market
option similar to the traditional market in mean price and price variability. Wal-Mart
has pursued a di erent strategy. To draw in suppliers, Wal-Mart initially employed a
pricing method similar to ﬁeld brokers’ prices, which were less than the wholesale market
less transport and suggest the existence of supernumerary proﬁts. Wal-Mart took advan-
tage of credit and transport failures that led to this spatial market segmentation, o ering
terms similar to traditional farmgate buyers. Early Wal-Mart supply agreements were not
welfare-improving for the farmer relative to the traditional market – indeed, they were
often stochastically dominated by the traditional market.
Beginning in 2007, Wal-Mart changed its supply agreements to provide farmers insurance
against the price risks of the traditional market. Farmers prefer these insurance contracts
to the traditional market, and the supply agreements now both provide access to those who
did not have market access previously and address the price risk problem in traditional
17spot markets. However, our analysis suggests that some farmers may be paying too much
for this insurance against traditional market price volatility.
Finally, our ﬁndings demonstrate that features of the traditional market including spatial
segmentation, output price variability, and competition among regional wholesalers im-
pact private contract outcomes. Improved understanding of supply relationships between
smallholders and supermarkets can bring new insight into constraints in traditional agri-
cultural markets and contribute to our knowledge of the causes and persistence of rural
poverty.
Notes
1We have good comprehensive estimates for transportation costs that include the per mile cost of the
truck, gasoline, and driver generated using the S´ ebaco cooperative’s round-trip cost for the trip between
Managua and S´ ebaco (50 miles oneway) and the truck’s capacity. The S´ ebaco cooperative rents the truck
from a member of the cooperative and pays the cost of the gasoline and the driver. All three cooperatives
are located on a good road network, at varying distances from Managua. We applied the per-pound/per-
mile transport cost to each cooperative’s mileage from Managua to generate cooperative-speciﬁc transport
costs. The cooperatives are at varying distances from Managua: Tomatoya is 70 miles away, Ocotal is 103
miles distant. Roads between cooperatives and Managua are of consistent and decent quality.
2This rate includes product rejection quantities; both La Colonia and Wal-Mart reject produce that does
not meet speciﬁcations and supplier farmers in our household survey reported per transaction crop rejection
rates between 0 and 80 percent with an average per transaction rejection percent over the 2000-2008 period
of 5.8 percent.
3If we test farmgate prices received by cooperatives from supermarkets against farmgate prices in tra-
ditional markets for all dates between 2000-2007, and not merely for restricted dates over which the coop-
eratives sold to supermarkets, our results do not change signiﬁcantly. Using the full series, we reject the
hypothesis that traditional and supermarket means are equal for green peppers (traditional market signiﬁ-
cantly higher for the full series) and salad tomatoes (La Colonia signiﬁcantly higher). All other results are
consistent whether we use the full or reduced series for the traditional market.
4NGOs assist the cooperatives of this analysis with credit, irrigation, and technical assistance. It could
be that the value of such subsidies exceeds the loss of direct mean price di erence, creating an artiﬁcial net
proﬁt not visible to our analysis. This is an interesting critical area for further study.
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Figure 1: Cooperative suppliers data coverage. Arrows indicate supply relationships that






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 2: First order stochastic dominance tests for roma tomato and salad tomato in
La Colonia (top row), Wal-Mart ﬁrst-generation (second row), and Wal-Mart second-
generation (bottom row). All price CDFs are plotted against corresponding traditional
market CDFs.
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24Without irrigation With irrigation Total
Small farmer (0-3.5 hectares) 36 5 41
Medium farmer (3.5-7) 4 0 4
Large farmer (> 7 hectares) 5 4 9
Total 45 9 54
Table 1: Supply cooperative farmers’ landholdings and irrigation in the year before joining
the supermarket supply chain.
25Crop Dates (mm/yy) ($C/kilo) ($C/kilo) p-value
Wal-Mart Traditional Wal-Mart
S´ ebaco co-op
Roma tomatoes 04/05-11/06 5.23 3.40 < 10 4
Salad tomatoes 04/05-11/06 6.68 4.41 < 10 4
Ocotal co-op
Roma tomatoes 06/06-05/08 6.33 4.24 < 10 4
Salad tomatoes 06/06-05/08 7.94 5.92 < 10 4
La Colonia Traditional La Colonia
S´ ebaco co-op
Roma tomatoes 04/06-12/07 6.40 6.30 p =0 .77
Salad tomatoes 04/06-12/07 7.88 9.99 < 10 4
Tomatoya co-op
Small green peppers 06/06-10/07 7.51 6.71 p =0 .09
Cabbage 06/06-10/07 1.57 2.60 < 10 4
Lettuce 06/06-10/07 5.57 4.85 < 10 4
Table 2: Mean farmgate prices in Wal-Mart and La Colonia compared with the traditional
market.
26Farmgate* mean Managua LC WM
Crop ($C)/kilo) n min max mode (est.) mean mean mean
S´ ebaco co-op
Indust. tomatoes 28 0.71 9.41 2.34 2.84 6.40/5.23 6.30 3.40
Tomatoya co-op
cabbage 32 0.20 3.17 1.10 1.16 1.57 2.60 -
lettuce 52 0.29 9.80 1.70 1.76 5.57 4.85 -
Ocotal co-op
indust. tomatoes 19 1.18 14.12 4.02 4.43 6.33 - 4.24
Table 3: Farmgate broker, Managua, La Colonia (LC), and Wal-Mart (WM) price means.
*farmgate min/max/mode reported by farmers in the 2008 household survey; n refers to the number of
regional observations for each crop
27Crop (units) Mean Variance CV
($C/kilo) ( /µ)
Wal-Mart (WM)
WM S´ ebaco co-op roma tomatoes 3.40 0.66 0.24
Managua roma tomatoes 5.23 2.68 0.31
WM S´ ebaco co-op salad tomatoes 4.41 0.44 0.15
Managua salad tomatoes 6.68 5.82 0.36
WM Ocotal co-op roma tomatoes 4.24 1.68 0.31
Managua roma tomatoes 6.33 7.51 0.43
WM Ocotal co-op salad tomatoes 5.92 0.64 0.14
Managua salad tomatoes 7.95 7.94 0.35
La Colonia (LC)
LC roma tomatoes 6.30 4.96 0.35
Managua roma tomatoes 6.40 7.06 0.42
LC salad tomatoes 9.99 2.81 0.17
Managua salad tomatoes 7.88 8.94 0.38
LC peppers 6.71 7.25 0.40
Managua peppers 7.51 6.47 0.34
LC cabbage 2.60 0.27 0.20
Managua cabbage 1.57 0.14 0.24
LC lettuce 4.85 2.59 0.33
Managua lettuce 5.57 1.59 0.23




La Colonia roma tomatoes (S´ ebaco) FOSD
La Colonia salad tomatoes (S´ ebaco) FOSD
La Colonia peppers (Tomatoya) FOSD
La Colonia cabbage (Tomatoya) FOSD
La Colonia lettuce (Tomatoya) no ﬁrst order dominance no ﬁrst order dominance
Wal-Mart ﬁrst-generation contracts
Wal-Mart roma tomatoes (S´ ebaco) FOSD
Wal-Mart salad tomatoes (S´ ebaco) FOSD
Wal-Mart second-generation contracts
Wal-Mart roma tomatoes (Ocotal) no ﬁrst order dominance no ﬁrst order dominance
Wal-Mart salad tomatoes (Ocotal) no ﬁrst order dominance no ﬁrst order dominance
Table 5: Stochastic dominance tests comparing supermarket and traditional per kilo far-
mgate CDFs.
29Ocotal Suppliers % with Non-suppliers % with
Method 1 n=20 R<3 n=30 R<3
Relative risk coe cient (R), mean 4.85 5.39
Range 0.14–20.09 20% 0.13–29.33 56.67%
(C$/kilo) % rational (C$/kilo) % rational
adopters adopters
Method 2 (wtp>2.03) (wtp>2.03)
Assuming R=1
Max mean price reduction, mean 2.23 60% 1.68 50%
Range 0.10–14.62 0.07–16.09
Assuming R=2
Max mean price reduction, mean 4.46 60% 3.36 66.6%
Range 0.21-29.24 0.14–32.18
Assuming R=3
Max mean price reduction, mean 6.70 70% 5.05 76.6%
Range 0.31–43.86 0.21–48.27
Table 6: Computed levels of relative risk aversion (Method 1) and willingness to pay
(Method 2). Observed di erence (¯ pt   ¯ ps) is 2.03 $C/kilo.
30